The Maryland Supreme Court issued a significant opinion on June 23 in Board of Education for Wicomico County v. Rhonda V. Sturm, clarifying the scope of sovereign immunity for local boards of education facing historical claims under the Child Victims Act of 2023 (CVA). The Court held that county boards retain complete sovereign immunity for claims arising from conduct before 1971, because the General Assembly never appropriated funds or provided a funding mechanism to pay such judgments. The Court explained clearly, “the only mechanism the General Assembly has ever provided for that purpose is [ ] authorizing and requiring the Board to procure comprehensive liability insurance,” which did not exist until July 1, 1971. (See Opinion at 40).
The Court also held that a lower court’s order denying a motion to dismiss on the ground of complete sovereign immunity is immediately appealable, meaning that county boards may appeal such orders after the motion to dismiss phase, while the case is pending, and do not need to wait for a final decision because that would frustrate the purpose of sovereign immunity. (See Opinion at 2-3).
While the Court was explicit in holding that county boards retain complete sovereign immunity for pre-1971 claims, the Court was not as clear about what this case means for post-1971 claims. The Court does not explicitly address this question, but the Court’s analysis leads to a clear implication that, because insurance is the only funding mechanism the General Assembly has ever authorized for county boards, the liability cap for any given claim should be tied to the insurance available at the time of the alleged conduct, not today’s statutory caps. In other words, even though current liability caps for CVA claims are $400,000, because the General Assembly required boards to carry $100,000 in coverage in, say, 1985, the liability cap for allegations of 1985 conduct would be $100,000, because a board’s exposure can be no greater than the funding mechanism that existed to support it.
One could argue further that even the statutory insurance requirement is not the liability ceiling, but rather the ceiling is the actual coverage carried by a board at the time, since the Court focuses its opinion substantially on funds actually “available” to satisfy a judgment. Based on such a reading, a board whose historical policy has lapsed or whose insurance carrier no longer exists could argue it faces no liability at all for that claim. The liability framework for post-1971 claims is thus not settled by this opinion and will likely require either further litigation or drive action by the General Assembly to resolve this issue with more certainty.
You can read the Maryland Supreme Court’s full opinion here.